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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred In Vacating Pierce's Conviction
A.

Introduction
The district court, on intermediate appeal, vacated the judgment of

conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Pierce guilty of violating a
domestic violence protection order, I.C. § 39-6312, and reversed the magistrate's
order denying Pierce's motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., pp.70-84.) Pierce's
motion for an acquittal, and the district court's decision, were based on the
assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support Pierce's conviction
because the state did not prove that Pierce was guilty of the uncharged crime of
disturbing the peace, I.C. § 18-6409.

The state appealed, asserting the district

court's conclusion in this regard is erroneous.
In response, Pierce contends the district court "properly" reversed his
conviction because the state "failed to provide evidence [that he] committed any
enumerated act in I.C. § 18-6409." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Pierce also argues
that dismissal was proper because, he asserts, "the civil protection order was
unconstitutionally vague." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
fail.

Both of Pierce's arguments

First, as noted in the state's opening brief, the state was not required to

prove the uncharged crime of disturbing the peace in order to prove Pierce
violated

the

domestic violation

(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-9.)

protection

order under I.C.

§

39-6312.

Second, this Court should decline to consider

Pierce's constitutional argument because it is not preserved and Pierce has not
established, or even attempted to establish, fundamental error.

1

The State Was Not Required To Prove A Violation Of LC. § 18-6409 In
Order To Prove A Violation Of I.C. § 39-6312
The district court erroneously decided that the evidence was insufficient
because the state did not prove the elements of a crime it did not charge, i.e.,
disturbing the peace in violation of I.C. § 18-6409.

(R., pp.70-84.)

Pierce

contends otherwise, arguing (1) that "[b]y including 'disturbed the peace' in the
complaint, the State made it an absolute necessity for that phrase to be defined";
(2) the district court "properly relied on I. C. § 18-6409 to provide meaning to
th[e] phrase" "disturbed the peace"; (3) "[t]he act of shutting off utilities is not
included as an enumerated act"

in

instruction

in

"went

to

the

jury

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-13.)

I.C. § 18-6409; and (4) the elements
a

wholly

incomprehensible

format."

None of these arguments demonstrate that

Pierce was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charged offense of violating
a civil protection order, or any other relief.
The majority of Pierce's arguments are irrelevant to the legal question of
whether the evidence was sufficient, which question only requires an evaluation
of whether there was substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997).
That Pierce (and the district court) believes the jury was not properly instructed
because it was not told the meaning of "disturbed the peace" or instructed on the
elements of disturbing the peace, has no bearing on whether the evidence was
sufficient to support Pierce's conviction. Pierce's other argument - that "shutting
off utilities" is not an "enumerated act" in I.C. § 18-6409 - also fails because it is

2

based on the false premise that the state was required to prove any element of
I.

§ 18-6409 as part

proving a violation

§39-631

the reasons

already set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the state was not required to do so.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-11.) Pierce's argument to the contrary is without merit.

C.

Pierce's Constitutional Challenge Is Not Preserved And Should Not Be
Considered
Pierce argues in the alternative that "it was proper for the District Court to

vacate the judgment in this case and enter an acquittal because the civil
protection order was unconstitutionally vague." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) This
Court should decline to consider Pierce's alternative argument because it is not
preserved.
Absent a showing of fundamental error, "Idaho appellate courts have
typically indicated that [they) will not consider the constitutionality of a statute[1]
for the first time on appeal." State v. Key, 149 Idaho 691, 695, 239 P.3d 796, 800
(2010). Pierce did not challenge the constitutionality of the civil protection order
before the magistrate or the district court.

(See generally R. (no motion to

dismiss filed based on constitutional challenge); see generally Tr.; Appellant
Brian Wade Pierce's Brief, p.3 (Issue: "Whether or not a court correctly denies a
defendant's Motion for acquittal and enters judgment against a defendant when

1

Assuming, arguendo, that Pierce's challenge to the constitutionality of the
protection order could be considered under the same framework as a
constitutional challenge to a statute, the same preservation standard would
apply.
3

the State offered no evidence in support

an essential element of a crime[.]")

(augmentation).) Pierce implicitly acknowledges as much when he states "[t]his
basis for dismissal isn't specifically argued by the District Court, but is
nonetheless included because if I.C. § 18-6409 is not referenced to define
'disturbing the peace,' than [sic] the phrase remains ambiguous." (Respondent's
Brief, p.14.) Pierce's belief that "disturbing the peace" is an ambiguous phrase
does not supplant his obligation to preserve a constitutional challenge to the
protection order he violated. Moreover, the core of Pierce's argument is not a
constitutional challenge, but is the same basic complaint he raises in relation to
his quest for an acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, which is his
belief that the jury should have been instructed on disturbing the peace as
codified at I.C. § 18-6409. This belief is incorrect. Further, even when viewed as
a constitutional challenge, Pierce has made no attempt to show this claim should
be considered under the rubric of fundamental error.

Pierce's constitutional

challenge is unpreserved and should not be considered, particularly since Pierce
has failed to meet his burden of showing fundamental error.
Because the district court erroneously concluded that Pierce was entitled
to an acquittal on the charge that he violated I.C. § 39-6312 based on the state's
failure to prove the uncharged crime of disturbing the peace, I.C. § 18-6409, the
district court's Memorandum Decision should be reversed.

4

CONCLUSION
state respectfully requests that this

reverse the

Memorandum Decision.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2015.
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